Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.
Not only Spain, but both Argentina and Brazil have also had a weak democratic tradition. However, the latter two countries have not succeeded in completing the transition to a democratic regime.5 Contrary to Spain, the contingency of a military intervention in the Argentine6 and Brazilian7 political process is still feasible, a fact which constrains everyday political life in these two countries. Indeed, both the Argentine and the Brazilian military authorities continue to behave autonomously vis-avis their constituted governments. These military authorities still predetermine some outcomes ex ante,8 given that they intimidate civilians.
They can also determine some outcomes ex post9 outside the normal political process. In such a situation, the prospect of democratic consolidation is hampered, thus opening the possibility of a political 6 Rail Alfonsfn suffered three coup attempts while the present incumbent, Carlos Menem, has already experienced one. 7 Recently the Brazilian media reported that the army was about to buy new uniforms without fulfilling the correct bureaucratic procedures in a transaction worth about $80 million. Rumours spread that the Minister of the Army, General Carlos Tinoco, was in a shaky position in the cabinet. He then publicly warned that unlike his civilian fellows, military ministers are not easily ousted. 'Tinoco diz que militares nao sao "fritados", ' Folha de Sao Paulo, 31 Oct. 1991 . 8 In 1988 , on the eve of the Congress Constituent voting on both Jose Sarney's five-year mandate and on presidentialism, the military threatened intervention, both if Sarney's mandate were shortened, and if parliamentarianism were approved. Thereafter, for the first time since the Constituinte's inception all 559 constituents turned up to vote and they thereupon approved presidentialism and an extension to Sarney's tenure. 9 On 26 June I991, the Brazilian Congress rejected Provisional Act 296 that granted a 20 % wage increase. The Ministries of the Army and the Air Force (but not the Navy) decided to go ahead and disregard Congress. Caught by surprise, President Collor asked the Chief of the Armed Forces Staff about the veracity of the report about his Ministers' decision. The President was informed that the Ministers argued that they had either to raise wages or to put up with insubordination in the barracks. 13 For example, whereas in Argentina the National Security Law (NSL) was abolish effectively persists in Brazil. Today, in theory, crimes against national security sh go before the civil jurisdiction rather than being brought for trial before mil courts. The I988 constitutional article Io9-IV asserts that federal judges hav authority to both prosecute and judge political crimes. However, in practice, given there is no legislation that deals with political crimes in Brazil, the National Secur Law is still the one that regulates political crimes. 14 In July i99I, Congress vetoed a wage increase for the military that had been prop by the executive. Collor's response typifies the tutelage game. for building a reliable intelligence service. Unhappy with SIDE's performance, Alfonsin re-established an old agency, the Central Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), created in 197I by the former President General Alejandro Lanusse, without developing a clear plan for controlling the intelligence apparatus.23 The CNI board (five civilians and six military) was supposed to control the flow of intelligence information but, oddly enough, it was headed by SIDE's secretary, Facundo Suarez. Thus from its inception it has been unclear which of the two agencies was mainly responsible for intelligence matters. The intelligence services were also handled pusillanimously by the major political parties.24 Radicals and Peronists diverged on whether SIDE or CNI should be the senior intelligence agency. Seeing that they could not reach an agreed decision, they wrote vaguely in article I5 of the April I989 Defence Law that the highest intelligence body would furnish strategic information. To make matters even worse, article 45 of the law practically negated article I 5. It postponed any changes in intelligence matters until a new law could be enacted within 365 days.25 The due date expired, nothing was done, and this matter is no longer on the political agenda of the Argentine Congress. Aug. I991.
32 The Army, the Navy and the Air Forces are working in parallel projects aiming to obtain enriched uranium. The Army wants to enrich uranium using graphite, the Air Force is trying lasers, and the Navy is using centrifuges. Parliament was the body that must approve defence laws and budgets. It became the body that was to declare war and to make peace; it must authorise international military treaties or accords. Besides that, Parliament had the right to debate the general lines of defence policy and approve the budget for armament programmes.
Argentine politicians on the other hand, instead of showing concern for building a new institutional framework that could have enabled a better control on defence matters, attempted to advance their short-term interests at the expense of the democratic regime. Sham parliamentary control over the intelligence services indicated the absence of a legislative routine on defence affairs. For instance, during Alfonsin's tenure, Peronist deputy Jose Luiz Manzano presented a proposal for parliamentary control over the intelligence services. At that moment the Radicals had a majority in the Lower Chamber but they did not endorse the proposal. Towards the end of 1989, Radical deputies, who by then had lost their majority in the Lower Chamber, decided to revive Manzano's proposal. Given the fears that the Senate would veto an attempt to transform such a proposal into law, the deputies proposed a parliamentary committee only within the province of the Lower Chamber.41 However, to avoid major resistance from the politicians, the text excluded from the commission's power a key element: budgetary control of the intelligence services.42
As in Argentina, a legislative routine on defence matters is absent in Brazil. During Sarney's government, parliamentary committees barely exercised any oversight over the military authorities. During Collor's tenure, however, there is a better interaction between the military and the congress. Nonetheless, it was not until one year after Collor's inauguration, and due to a random case that the first military authority, Army Minister, General Carlos Tinoco, appeared before a review committee. In April 1991 General Tinoco explained to Congress the hostilities that army troops had taken part in on the Amazonian frontier with Colombia. However Congressional inertia over the control of the military persisted. For instance, when Navy Minister, Admiral Mario Cesar Flores, addressed a review by parliamentary commission on the Brazilian nuclear programme, he stated that the Navy could not abide by the law that protected the Brazilian computer and electronics industry because 'if we were to comply with this law, we could not fit out a corvette like Inhauma.43 Congress did not take any stance against the ministry. However, if a common citizen is caught bringing forbidden electronic or computer components into the country he is fined and may go to jail. vigorously pursued in Spain. For example, the Conservative leader, Fraga Iribarne, did not like the idea that the police would be detached from the military, since it would then be harder to call on the armed forces to control internal social unrest. However, the 1978 Constitution severed Franco's police from the armed forces and created the FuerTay Cuerpos de Seguridad. Indeed, the process of transforming old agents of repression into guardians of a democratic order was not easy. More remained to be done. In 1979, Suarez renamed the Policia Armada and equipped their members with new uniforms. The Armed Police had been in charge of political repression, and they used to wear grey uniforms that resembled those of the Nazis.44 The government replaced the dull grey uniform with smarter brown ones and the Policia Nacional (National Police) was born.45 Suarez realised that he needed to make more substantial changes if he wanted to lay the foundation of a modern urban force. Indeed, the old police skeleton remained now with new uniforms: no personnel were replaced, and the new police force lingered on as a paramilitary organisation led by army officers. So next he completely severed the police from the military. To establish a professional code, where they could see themselves as policemen rather than as soldiers, the police officer corps 43 Veja, 19 June 1991. 44 The Spanish for grey is gris. Therefore, some Spaniards called the Armed Police the 'Gristapo'. 45 Robert C. Hudson, 'Democracy and the Spanish Police Forces', The Police Journal, no.
would have to be drawn from the civilian population rather than from the ranks of the armed forces.46 Narciso Serra, Felipe Gonzalez's Minister of Defence, carried on Suarez's previous moves to demilitarise the police forces. Serra specified that police officers should be trained in their own academies, and the government should recognise police unions. Besides that, in 1983, he sponsored the merger of the Cuerpos Superior de la Policia, the plainclothes police force, with the National Police under the new title of Cuerpo Nacional de la Policza. With this move, Serra increased the number of civilians in the new police force. By the next year, 1984, for the first time, police forces were absent from the Armed Forces Day Parade.47 The Guardia Civil demanded a solution of its own. The I980 Organic Law 6 articles 3 8-9 established that during peacetime the Guard depends on the Ministry of Interior, when it is needed to keep order and public security, but the Guard reports to the Minister of Defence if he wants the force to perform military activities such as manoeuvres. In time of war, however, the Guard depends solely on the Minister of Defence. Traditionally, the Guard has been seen as a reactionary force. Its members used to live in isolated barracks, where they exerted their authority over the countryside, the strongest bulwark of Francoism. In November 1986, for the first time in I 5o years, Serra appointed a member of the socialist party, Luis Roldain, to command the Guard. Serra's plan was to create one civil police force and one militarised (but not military): one similar to the Police Nationale and French Gendarmerie. Unlike the Franco era, a Guard could now become a soldier or a policeman, but neither a soldier nor a policeman could became a Guard.48
In Argentina, both the National Gendarmerie and the Naval Prefecture became independent paramilitary organisations rather than extensions of the armed forces. However, they were not placed under the control of the Ministry of Interior, but under the control of the Ministry of Defence, both in peace-and in war-time. Neither are the police forces under forbidden to create unions and to strike, any wrongdoing is to be judged not by common law but under the military penal code. Besides that, the Constitution created a conflict of jurisdiction. While article z2-XXI establishes that the Federal Government, through the Army Ministry, can legislate about mobilising and calling up the military police, another article (I44-IV) states that although the military police forces and fire fighters are extensions of the armed forces, they are answerable to state governors. Therefore, the military policeman has two patrons: the state governor who pays his wage, and the Army which controls his armament supply through the Inspetoria Geral da Polzcia Militar (IGPM) besides coordinating police operations. In case of social unrest, the military policeman may choose either to follow the state governor's authority, or to join specific army units scattered throughout the country whose function is to incorporate the military policemen.
(6) The military have played a major role in setting the standards for promotion patterns
The Spanish Parliament discusses extensively which officers deserve to be promoted, and then recommends them to the executive for further approval.
In Argentina, the President of the Republic cannot promote officers to the rank of General without the Senate's consent. The importance of having a strong upper chamber was mainly felt at the beginning of Alfonsin's tenure. The armed forces had to bargain not only with the President, but also with the Senate, about the promotion of some officers who were linked with the dirty war. In some cases, Alfonsin was ready to turn the page, but some senators did not agree to reward those who had violated human rights.49 The Brazilian Congress does not have any power vis-a-vis promotion to the rank of General and above. The 1988 Constitution in its article 84/XIII states that the President of the Republic is the one responsible for promoting the top brass. In practice the armed forces present a promotion list and the President rubber-stamps it.50 Such presidential behaviour helps to strengthen the institutional linkage between the military and the President rather than with the legislature. In view of this, the Brazilian armed forces must be seen as an extension of executive power to the detriment of the legislature. 57 This refers to the Mansfield Doctrine that was used against rioters in October I 83 I in Bristol, England. The doctrine stated that soldiers could be used in civil disorders, but only if they were used as civilians. That is to say, if a military person's actions in the course of a riot had exceeded the powers with which he was invested, he might be punished not by a court-martial but upon an indictment in a civilian court. The idea Its purpose was to regulate the armed forces' organisation, and to specify under what conditions they could be used. It said nothing about the army's deployment58 and it maintained the armed forces' role as guardians of law and order. Such a prerogative is absent from any truly democratic constitution. In other words, the military retained the potentiality of becoming an independent enforcement body during internal unrest.
(9) Military control over specific areas of economic activity (aeronautics industry, navigation, aviation, etc.) Neither appears in the Brazilian column 'yes' appears in the Spanish one.
Argentina, however, is in an intermediary situation. In six prerogatives she differs from Brazil and, consequently, resembles Spain. In the other three prerogatives, Argentina looks very much like Brazil. Although quantitatively Argentina is closer to the Spanish case, the three most difficult military prerogatives remain to be abolished, that is to say, the lack of parliamentary control over the intelligence forces, the lack 58 The majority of the army's troops remain stationed close to urban centres, rather than at the Brazilian borders. For instance, the Vila Militar, one of the biggest garrisons in the Southern Cone, is located in Rio de Janeiro where there is no space for tank 
